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In The Disability Integration Presumption:  Thirty Years Later,
1
 Profes-
sor Ruth Colker offers a revisionist interpretation of the part of the 
federal special education law that requires: 
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . [must 
be] educated with children who are not disabled, and [that] special 
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities 
from the regular educational environment [must] occur[] only when 
the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in 
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily.
2
 
Professor Colker would not apply this integration presumption, or 
would apply it only in the weakest possible form, when the school dis-
trict complies with its additional obligation under the federal regula-
tions to offer a continuum of services—regular classes, special classes, 
special school, home instruction, instruction in hospitals and institu-
tions—and when the district provides for supplementary services, such 
as resource room or itinerant teachers, to be delivered in regular class 
placements.
3
 
In this Response, I contend that Professor Colker’s revision is un-
supported and would be unwise.  But that is not to say that a new way 
of looking at the integration presumption is wholly out of order.  The 
integration presumption should not be applied in a simple-minded 
way to say that general education is always best under all circum-
stances.  Instead, the presumption should operate as a presumption 
ought to:  in the absence of other evidence, it should be the rule.  If 
the school is arguing for integration, the presumption ought to carry 
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some, though not very great, weight.  If the parent is arguing for inte-
gration, the presumption should be much stronger.
4
  More impor-
tantly, the second half of the language of the statutory provision em-
bodying the presumption should be taken seriously.  Separate classes 
should be used only when supplemental services cannot make general 
education work for a given child.  The emphasis should be on the ser-
vices, and the services should be broadly defined to include such 
things as co-teaching by special education professionals, aide services, 
assistive technology, behavior intervention, and initiatives to prevent 
harassment and mistreatment by teachers and peers.  The services 
should be intense and individualized.  When they are delivered sepa-
rately, they should be temporary or provided outside of the regular 
school day. 
This Response will first summarize and answer Professor Colker’s 
contentions.  Second, it will suggest what the focus of the discussion 
ought to be, that is, which services and protections are being offered 
to educate a child within general education.  Finally, it will suggest 
that a more nuanced approach to integration fits well with the 
broader reform of special education law. 
I.  THE RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR COLKER’S ARGUMENT 
Professor Colker’s argument is that the original purpose of the in-
tegration presumption was “to hasten the closing of disability-only in-
stitutions.”
5
  She further contends that much of the case law under the 
provision applies the presumption too strongly in favor of integrating 
children with disabilities into regular classes;
6
 that educational re-
search does not support the application of a strong presumption in 
favor of integration;
7
 and that an analogy to racial desegregation also 
does not support a strong disability integration presumption.
8
  My 
 
4
Regarding the various approaches to applying legal presumptions, see 2 JOHN W. 
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344, at 443-59 (5th ed. 1999) (describing 
the “bursting bubble” theory and competing approaches advocating stronger effects 
such as shifts in the burdens of persuasion and instructions to juries). 
5
Colker, supra note 1, at 795. 
6
Id. at 811-12, 814-21 (discussing Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 
1983), and Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
7
Id. at 825. 
8
Id. at 838.  The transmission of disability culture, particularly the culture devel-
oped around the use of sign language at state schools, is sometimes cited as a ground 
to place children in separate institutions, but Professor Colker does not rely on this 
consideration in this paper, and elsewhere seems ambivalent.  See Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All:  A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 1474 
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view is that the history of the provision does not have much to do with 
deinstitutionalization; the case law she cites is largely beside the point; 
educational research supports integration that is done properly; and 
the race analogy is not a persuasive argument against a strong integra-
tion presumption—indeed in some respects it supports it. 
A.  History 
Professor Colker’s position that Congress created the integration 
presumption to hasten the closing of inhumane disability-only institu-
tions caused me to do a double-take.
9
  I was a law student in the mid-
to-late 1970s and worked on deinstitutionalization cases in a law 
school clinic.  During that time, a close friend of mine was a special 
education teacher.  We had many conversations about deinstitution-
alization and about mainstreaming children in school, but the two 
topics were related only in the vague sense that both had to do with 
disability and the law.  When she talked about applying “least restric-
tive environment” principles in her work, the conversation concerned 
such things as her attempts to persuade the regular education second-
grade teacher to take a student with Down Syndrome for part, and 
then all, of the day.  The point then, as now, was that special classes 
for students with disabilities—in the words of the statutory provision, 
“removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational en-
vironment”
10
—should occur only when education cannot be provided 
in the regular educational setting with extra help and services.  True, 
schools and institutions that enrolled only children with disabilities 
existed then (and do now), but the idea that Congress wanted noth-
ing more than to move children out of those institutions when it en-
acted § 1412(a)(5)(A) does not fit with reality. 
A survey of the education literature affirms this conclusion.
11
  
 
(2007) (commenting on the possibility of offering deaf children with cochlear im-
plants the chance to go to mainstream schools and preserving the ability of other deaf 
children to study in intensive sign language classrooms).  For a discussion of the topic, 
see Mark C. Weber, Inclusive Education in the United States and Internationally:  Challenges 
and Response, 3 REV. DISABILITY STUD. 19, 28-29 (2007). 
9
Professor Colker draws to some degree on personal experience in making her 
claims, and I will draw on personal experience as well. 
10
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2000). 
11
So does some of the history recounted in one of Professor Colker’s more recent 
papers.  See Colker, supra note 8, at 1427-28 (“In the 1960s and 1970s, educators began 
to publish articles questioning the effectiveness of self-contained schools and special 
education classes.  Their work laid the foundation for the concept of ‘least restrictive 
alternative’—that children should be educated in the most integrated setting possi-
ble.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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Education sources from the era around the passage of the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
12
 frequently discuss main-
streaming or least-restrictive-environment ideas. Although there are 
passing references to deinstitutionalization, the sources focus on the 
same topic my friend was discussing:  getting students out of self-
contained public school classes and into regular education classes, ei-
ther part-time or full-time, with adequate support to enable the chil-
dren to thrive there.
13
 
 
12
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400--1482 (2000 & Supp. IV 2005) (now called the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act). 
13
See generally Evelyn Deno, Summary of Presentations, in MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDU-
CATION:  ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN CENTERS 28, 31 (Philip H. Mann ed., 
1974) [hereinafter MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION] (describing conference discus-
sions about the need to change regular education to accommodate children with mild 
and moderate disabilities); Albert H. Fink, Implications for Teacher Preparation, in MAIN-
STREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN 101, 103 (A.J. Pappanikou & James L. 
Paul eds., 1977) (reporting on a conference held in February, 1975:  “The thrust of the 
mainstreaming movement . . . has aimed at providing handicapped children with edu-
cational services that depend less heavily than in the past upon special self-contained 
classes, combined with a greater utilization of the regular classroom.  The former 
placements have been viewed as inadequate for many handicapped children . . . .”); 
Frank M. Hewett, The Orchestration of Success, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DIS-
TURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 80, 84 (discussing the potential for creative efforts by edu-
cators in regular classrooms to improve the educational experience of all children 
while accommodating children with emotional disturbance); Richard A. Johnson & 
Rita M. Grismer, The Harrison-University Cooperative Resource Center, in MAINSTREAM SPE-
CIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 84, 84 (describing efforts from the mid-1960s to move chil-
dren from Educable Mentally Retarded special class settings to regular classes); Philip 
H. Mann & Rose Marie McClung, Training Regular Teachers in Learning Disabilities, in 
MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 110, 110 (discussing the need for regular 
classroom teachers to prepare to serve atypical learners); Charles A. Meisgeier, The 
Houston Plan—Retraining of Regular Classroom Teachers To Work with Handicapped Children 
Within the Regular Classroom Setting, in MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 77, 77 
(describing the training of master teachers in methods of serving children with dis-
abilities in regular classrooms with personalized programs for all children); William C. 
Morse, The Psychology of Mainstreaming Socio-Emotionally Disturbed Children, in MAIN-
STREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 18, 18 (“Special education 
professionals range in opinion about mainstreaming from seeing it as a loss of finan-
cial and operational control to helping children to the dawn of the new day when spe-
cial education is about to direct and reform the total educational establishment.”); 
James L. Paul, Mainstreaming Emotionally Disturbed Children, in MAINSTREAMING EMO-
TIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 1, 2 (“Mainstreaming, if taken in its narrow-
est sense of moving children from special classes to regular classes, raises some very 
basic questions.”); id. at 12-13 (“Children who are in special classes and could profit 
more from an instructional program in the regular classroom should be moved to the 
regular classroom with the necessary supportive services to make that adaptation suc-
cessful.”); Phyllis F. Perelman & Wayne L. Fox, Training Regular Classroom Teachers To 
Provide Special Education Services:  The Consulting Teacher Program, in MAINSTREAM SPE-
CIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 134, 134 (noting that the rural nature of Vermont renders 
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That being so, there is no reason to be baffled at the integration 
presumption embodied in the consent decree in Pennsylvania Ass’n for 
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC),
14
 a prime influence on the 
federal special education law.  The case, which was not about deinsti-
tutionalization, concerned appropriate education for children with 
mental retardation who either were not in the public schools at all or 
were served in inadequate programs.
15
  The parties drafted the decree 
in accordance with the advice of educators about the best approach to 
educating children with mental retardation, and so it came out adopt-
ing the same proposition as the contemporary educational literature
16
 
and, for that matter, my friend:  place children in regular education 
whenever possible, giving them adequate services to make main-
streaming work.
17
  It is no shock that there is no explanation in the 
 
special classes impractical in many areas); Maynard C. Reynolds, Introduction to SPECIAL 
EDUCATION AND SCHOOL SYSTEM DECENTRALIZATION 1, 6 (Maynard C. Reynolds ed., 
1975) (“Mainstreaming is not a new concept although the term is new and has come 
into prominence only recently.  For many decades, children with mild handicaps and 
learning problems had been admitted to regular classrooms where they were expected 
to keep up as well as they could with minimal or no extra assistance. . . . The current 
concept of mainstreaming embodies a supportive structure.”); William C. Rhodes, Be-
yond Abnormality:  Into the Mainstream, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED 
CHILDREN, supra, at 31, 36-37 (noting the contemporaneous deinstitutionalization 
movement, but primarily linking mainstreaming and deinstitutionalization as two 
among many phenomena tied to new progressive social consciousness); H. Rutherford 
Turnbull III, Legal Implications, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHIL-
DREN, supra, at 43, 45-46 (stating that the mainstreaming preference arises from un-
equal educational opportunities because of the frequent placement of children with 
special needs in the worst facilities with the least capable teachers and poor funding, 
and drawing a comparison to racial segregation); University Programs in Teacher Train-
ing, in MAINSTREAM SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 106, 106-09 (discussing five pro-
grams used to train regular classroom teachers in understanding aspects of disability 
and special education); Richard J. Whelan, Human Understanding of Human Behavior, in 
MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 64, 64-66 (noting that 
models of education for children with emotional disturbance developed in residential 
facilities but moved by the 1960s to public schools and day facilities); Ernest P. Willen-
berg, The Three D’s:  Decategorization, Declassification, and Desegregation, in MAINSTREAM 
SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra, at 21, 21-22 (noting that the phase of deinstitutionalization 
of children occurred after World War II, and describing the current phase as that of 
replacing special day schools, centers, and classes with mainstream instruction); Frank 
H. Wood, Implications for Leadership Training, in MAINSTREAMING EMOTIONALLY DIS-
TURBED CHILDREN, supra, at 89, 90 (explaining that the “‘least restrictive’ situation” 
principle encourages educators to remove children from regular school situations only 
“for the shortest possible time and to the shortest possible distance,” such as in part-
time resource rooms or special programs in the same building). 
14
343 F. Supp. 279, 306-16 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (presenting the amended consent 
agreement). 
15
Id. at 282-83. 
16
See sources cited supra note 13. 
17
PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 307. 
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opinion that accompanies the decree.  The primary purpose of the 
opinion was to establish a colorable constitutional claim to give juris-
diction to the court for entering a decree at all.  There was no reason 
to justify every term of what the parties agreed to. 
There is not much discussion of the integration presumption in 
the legislative history of the Education of the Handicapped Act, as it 
was amended up until the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975 (EAHCA).  This absence, though, hardly supports the idea 
that deinstitutionalization was the objective of the provision.
18
  The 
more logical explanation for the lack of lengthy discussion of integra-
tion in the legislative history of the EAHCA and its predecessors is that 
by the 1970s mainstreaming of children with disabilities in regular 
education classes had become best educational practice.  This expla-
nation is reinforced by a passage in the House Report on the EAHCA 
stating, “The [House] Committee urges that where possible and 
where most beneficial to the child, special educational services be 
provided in a classroom situation.  An optimal situation, of course, 
would be one in which the child is placed in a regular classroom.”
19
 
The point, then, is that the statutory presumption’s pedigree is 
educational theory and practice; the presumption is only tangentially 
related to deinstitutionalization.  It is better to assume that Congress 
meant what its language denotes than to attribute an unwritten mean-
ing to limit the presumption’s application to deinstitutionalization. 
B.  Case Law 
Not surprisingly, Professor Colker criticizes several cases interpret-
ing the integration presumption on the ground that they apply it in 
accordance with a broad purpose rather than the more narrow pur-
pose she attributes to it.
20
  Surprisingly, however, Professor Colker’s 
 
18
In fact, closing institutions for children was the focus of a portion of the 1974 
Education Amendments different from the provisions that eventually became the EA-
HCA.  This initiative allocated impact funding to school districts receiving children 
discharged from state-operated schools and hospitals.  The funding carried the express 
purpose of promoting deinstitutionalization.  See H.R. REP. No. 93-805, at 24 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4093, 4115 (“It is the Committee’s hope that this provi-
sion will afford the greatest encouragement to the states to initiate and accelerate pro-
grams designed to de-institutionalize as many of these children as possible.”). 
19
H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 9 (1975) (emphasis added).  The Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare quoted this passage in the Federal Register pages ex-
plaining the proposed regulations under that law.  Education of Handicapped Chil-
dren and Incentive Grants Program, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,966, 56,972 (Dec. 30, 1976). 
20
None of the cases Professor Colker cites, nor any of the legislative history, sup-
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survey of the relevant case law stops abruptly at the end of the 1980s, 
and contains only passing references to more recent cases.  This omis-
sion prevents her from identifying the principal controversy over inte-
gration in the 1990s and 2000s. 
The current controversy is not over whether application of the in-
tegration presumption should be broad, though from time to time 
writers have argued that the provision should be limited in accor-
dance with cases such as DeVries v. Fairfax County School Board
21
 and 
A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School District
22
 (which Professor Colker criticizes 
for applying the presumption too weakly).
23
  The current controversy 
is over the services to be provided in the regular classroom to make 
integration work.  To a lesser degree, there are also controversies over 
using civil rights law to prevent harassment of students with disabilities 
(so as to make integration succeed and make it an attractive option 
for children and parents), and over how much deference to give 
school districts in decisions over integration.  These issues are dis-
cussed in greater detail below. 
C.  Educational Literature 
In her review of the literature, Professor Colker mostly argues that 
there are insufficient numbers of controlled studies of large popula-
tions to show that the educational benefits of regular instruction are 
greater than those of separate instruction.
24
  Various experts in the 
field survey the literature and come to conclusions contrary to Profes-
sor Colker’s on this point.
25
  Professor Colker notes that many authori-
 
ports the contention that § 1412(a)(5)(A) should magically vanish when the school 
has a complete range of placements available.  That duty is an independent one under 
the federal regulations.  Continuum of Alternative Placements, 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 
(2007). 
21
882 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 1989). 
22
813 F.2d 158, 164 (8th Cir. 1987). 
23
There is a legal literature discussing integration and the integration presump-
tion, but Professor Colker does not refer to it.  The scholarship includes:  Anne Proffitt 
Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools:  The Case Against “Inclusion,” 72 WASH. L. REV. 
775 (1997); Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU 
EDUC. & L.J. 189; Mark C. Weber, The Least Restrictive Environment Obligation as an Enti-
tlement to Educational Services:  A Commentary, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 147 (2001); 
Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 599 (1995); Joshua Andrew Wolfe, Note, A Search for the Best IDEA: Balancing the 
Conflicting Provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1627 (2002). 
24
See Colker, supra note 1, at 825 (stating that the available evidence is insufficient 
to warrant an integration presumption). 
25
See, e.g., Jose Blackorby et al., Relationships Between the School Programs of Students 
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ties supporting integration allow for use of resource rooms or other 
limited forms of separate instruction, and that is undoubtedly correct, 
although it appears that what resource-room services entail is not uni-
form.  Primarily, she gathers authorities that stress that inclusive pro-
grams have to be designed carefully to be successful and must provide 
for significant assistive services and accommodations for main-
streamed students.
26
  On this last proposition, I emphatically agree. 
D.  The Race Analogy 
Professor Colker devotes twice as much page space to discussing 
literature about the educational benefits of racial integration as she 
does to discussing literature about the educational benefits of placing 
children with disabilities in the mainstream.  As she acknowledges, the 
analogy between race and disability is flawed.
27
  To the extent that it is 
relevant, what it suggests is that integration requires special efforts to 
be successful.  Professor Colker says that, when applied to integration 
of children with disabilities, the lessons of racial integration are as fol-
lows: 
1) Schools need to teach tolerance and promote cooperation. 
2) Teachers in regular education need training in educating students 
with special needs. 
 
with Disabilities and Their Longitudinal Outcomes, in WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE?  INFLU-
ENCES ON OUTCOMES FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 7-1, 7-7 (2007) (“Bivariate 
analyses show that, across measures, students with disabilities who took more academic 
classes in general education settings had greater academic success than peers who took 
fewer classes there.”); Rebecca A. Hines, Inclusion in Middle Schools, ERIC DIGEST, Dec. 
2001, available at http://www.ericdigests.org/2002-3/inclusion.htm (collecting stud-
ies); Wayne Sailor & Blair Roger, Rethinking Inclusion:  Schoolwide Applications, 86 PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN 503, 504 (2005) (“[T]he sum of available evidence overwhelmingly 
supports integrated instructional approaches over those that are categorically segre-
gated, regardless of the categorical label or severity of the disability.” (footnote omit-
ted)); see also Michael F. Giangreco, Extending Inclusive Opportunities, 64 EDUC. LEADER-
SHIP 34, 34-37 (2007) (providing a framework for how teachers should handle the 
inclusion of students with significant disabilities within mainstream classrooms); An-
nette Holahan & Virginia Costenbader, A Comparison of Developmental Gains for Preschool 
Children with Disabilities in Inclusive and Self-Contained Classrooms, 20 TOPICS IN EARLY 
CHILDHOOD SPECIAL EDUC. 224, 233-34 (2000) (reporting on two studies that show 
better performance in the socio-emotional domain for children in inclusive preschool 
settings); Patrick A. Schwarz, Special Education:  A Service, Not a Sentence, 64 EDUC. LEAD-
ERSHIP 39-42 (2007) (reporting a case study about a wayward disabled student).  See 
generally sources cited supra note 13 (collecting 1970s sources, which heavily support 
mainstreaming). 
26
See Colker, supra note 1, at 826-35. 
27
Id. at 838 n.183. 
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3) Individualization matters. 
4) Mainstreaming should begin early. 
5) Parental involvement is crucial. 
6) Smaller schools often work better than large ones. 
7) And (almost as an afterthought), harassment has to be taken seri-
ously.
28
 
None of these revelations undermines the value of a broad integration 
presumption for children with disabilities.  Moreover, as Colker notes, 
African-Americans are significantly overrepresented in the mental re-
tardation and emotional disturbance disability categories.
29
  That fact 
alone supports vigorous inclusion efforts so that placement in special 
education does not become racial resegregation.  It does not warrant 
supplanting the disability integration presumption with the contin-
uum-of-services requirement. 
II.  THE REAL ISSUE 
The real issue in the debate over the application of the disability 
integration presumption is the presence or absence of related services 
for the child in the integrated setting.  The educational literature 
identifies related services as the means to success in a mainstreamed 
placement.  The related-services issue emerges in current decisions 
from the courts, and it is the key to resolving the current controversies 
in the schools. 
A.  In the Courts 
The case law has come to reflect the true problem with regard to 
applying the disability presumption.  Two critical cases from the 1990s 
are Sacramento City Unified School District, Board of Education v. Rachel 
H.
30
 and Oberti v. Board of Education.
31
  In Rachel H., the Ninth Circuit 
required the placement of a child with mental retardation in a full-
time regular education program with the help of a part-time aide and 
other assistance.
32
  The school wanted to mainstream her for art, mu-
sic, lunch, and recess, but not for academic subjects.  The court 
placed weight on the testimony of the parents’ experts and the child’s 
 
28
See id. at 850-53. 
29
Id. at 853. 
30
14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). 
31
995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).  Professor Colker mentions these cases in a foot-
note discussing multifactor tests used in applying the presumption.  Colker, supra note 
1, at 812 n.90. 
32
The child’s IQ was said to be 44.  Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400. 
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teacher in her mainstreamed setting, and relied especially on the 
child’s progress in social and communication skills when in that envi-
ronment.  The court adopted a test that focused on, among other 
considerations, the “educational benefits available to Rachel in a regu-
lar classroom, supplemented with appropriate aids and services, as com-
pared with the educational benefits of a special education class-
room.”
33
  In Oberti, the Third Circuit required a school district to place 
a child with Down Syndrome in a mainstreamed class.
34
  The court ac-
knowledged that a mainstreamed class had previously been unsuccess-
ful for the child, but stressed that no supplemental aids and services 
had been provided.
35
  The evidence showed that the child could suc-
ceed if provided services, such as the assistance of an itinerant special 
education instructor, special education training for the regular educa-
tion teacher, modification of the curriculum, parallel instruction, and 
part-time use of a resource room.
36
 
The court in Oberti put the emphasis where it belongs, on the ser-
vices to be provided: 
 One of our principal tasks in this case is to provide standards for de-
termining when a school’s decision to . . . place [a] child in a segregated 
environment violates IDEA’s presumption in favor of mainstreaming.  
This issue is particularly difficult in light of the apparent tension within 
the Act between the strong preference for mainstreaming and the re-
quirement that schools provide individualized programs tailored to the 
specific needs of each disabled child. 
 The key to resolving this tension appears to lie in the school’s proper 
use of “supplementary aids and services” . . . .
37
 
Courts have begun to recognize the need to act creatively to make 
integration work.  L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School District involved a 
child with autism, for whom the school district proposed a non-
mainstreamed preschool placement with a few nondisabled children 
participating.
38
  The program also featured speech therapy, occupa-
tional therapy, and eight to fifteen hours per week of applied behav-
ioral analysis (ABA) services.  The court rejected this proposal and 
upheld the parents’ position that the child should continue in a pri-
 
33
Id. (emphasis added) (describing the district court’s reasoning, as later adopted 
by the Ninth Circuit). 
34
995 F.2d at 1206-07. 
35
Id. at 1220-21. 
36
Id. at 1222. 
37
Id. at 1214 (citations and footnote omitted). 
38
379 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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vate, mainstreamed preschool class with the assistance of an aide, and 
with thirty-five to forty hours of ABA services delivered primarily at 
home.
39
  The evidence showed that the extensive ABA services were 
necessary to enable the child to function in a mainstreamed school 
environment.  Although eight to fifteen hours would have permitted 
some educational progress, the test the court applied was how many 
hours were needed to enable the child to succeed in a regular class.
40
  
The court thus required additional services—the ABA—but outside 
the regular school day, so that the child could be in the mainstream 
during the school day and thrive there.  The task for the future is to 
make integration work through judicious use of intensive services, 
sometimes separate, sometimes temporary, and whenever possible 
outside of regular school hours.
41
 
 
39
Id. at 977-79. 
40
See id. at 976-77. 
41
Many courts, though not all, have also begun to take seriously the problem of 
harassment of students with disabilities.  Space does not permit a full development of 
this topic here, but it should be noted that many recent decisions have upheld dam-
ages claims and other remedies where schools have failed to take stern action against 
peer and staff harassment.  See MARK C. WEBER, DISABILITY HARASSMENT 61-97 (2007) 
(discussing current case law).  Unfortunately, many courts have barred relief for these 
claims, a reality that interferes immensely with the goal of integration.  See, e.g., 
Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (denying a 
tuition reimbursement remedy to parents who placed their emotionally disturbed 
child in a private school following his harassment in public school).  Many courts have 
also been excessively deferential regarding school district decisions to place children 
in segregated settings, letting the general rule that public school officials have control 
over decisions of educational methodology override the specific congressional com-
mand in favor of integration.  See Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 41-45 (2006) [hereinafter We-
ber, Reflections] (discussing an example of inappropriate deference to public school 
decisionmaking in School District of Wisconsin Dells v. Z.S. ex rel. Littlegeorge, 295 
F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2002)).  At the turn of this past century, systemic litigation also be-
gan to address service delivery procedures and how they impede or promote integra-
tion.  See, e.g., Reid L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 358 F.3d 511, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2004) (re-
jecting an effort to overturn a consent decree requiring integration and the provision 
of services to facilitate it); Reid L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d 1009, 1023 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (same); Gaskin v. Pennsylvania, 389 F. Supp. 2d 628, 631-36 (E.D. Pa. 2005) 
(approving a class action settlement to promote the placement of children in main-
stream settings, expand related services and accommodations, and establish monitor-
ing procedures); J.G. v. Bd. of Educ., 26 IDELR 114, 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (entering a 
consent decree providing for the inclusive education of children with disabilities); see 
also Lopez v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 385 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1002-04 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 
(awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff in systemic litigation over the provision of ser-
vices in the least restrictive environment). 
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B.  In the Schools 
As Professor Colker’s personal reflections suggest, many parents 
resist efforts to integrate their children.  Many school districts resist 
integration as well.  I submit that the parental resistance is rarely due 
to sophisticated evaluation of the educational research.  Parents’ con-
cerns about adequacy of education are usually based on information 
or beliefs about the specific integrated options being offered to their 
child.  In many instances, the children are already in integrated public 
school programs, and whatever is happening is not good.  Adequate 
support services may not be offered.  Services promised may not be 
delivered.  The general education teachers may not be cooperating.  
Class sizes may be too large.  Physical or verbal harassment may be oc-
curring.  A disability-only school, particularly a private school, looks 
extremely attractive. 
When parents resist for these reasons, one is hard-pressed to say 
they are wrong.  Perhaps they should fight for integration that works, 
but their children are growing up rapidly, and the adaptive prefer-
ence of a separate program makes sense for them.  Law often imposes 
presumptions based on an unscientific calculation of which position is 
more frequently justified.  When parents resist integration, the pre-
sumption in favor of the integrated option proposed by the public 
schools should not be a strong one.  It should be dispelled by evi-
dence that the school’s specific proposal, as likely to be implemented, 
will not be successful for a given child.
42
 
When the school authorities resist parental efforts to obtain more 
integrated settings for their children, it may be because they think 
that effective services cannot be provided in the mainstream.  It may 
be, however, that the services could be given there but would be 
costly, and the state’s allocation of special education funding favors 
services in separate settings.
43
  It may also be that general education 
personnel resist having the child in an integrated class.  For many 
educators, special education remains a place to send the child, rather 
than a bundle of services to help the child.  When the public school 
resists integration and the parents push for it, the balance of prob-
 
42
This is a different rule from what Professor Colker advocates.  The question is 
not whether the school has a continuum of services available.  It is how good the cho-
sen option is for a specific child. 
43
This appears to have been much of the motivation in Rachel H.  See Sacramento 
City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(addressing the school district’s claim that it would lose funding if Rachel H. spent less 
than “51% of the day” in a special education class). 
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abilities tips in favor of the parents’ position.  There is enough risk 
that the district is motivated by cost, internal politics, or standard op-
erating procedure to call for a strong presumption in favor of the in-
tegrated option.
44
 
CONCLUSION:  A NUANCED APPROACH 
The integration presumption should stay, but it should be applied 
in a nuanced fashion.  The integration need not always be total, or at 
least temporarily not total.  The focus should be on the intensity of 
services provided to facilitate success in the mainstream.  When par-
ents resist integrated settings for their children, it is crucial to scruti-
nize the quality of the services offered and assess whether they truly 
will enable the child to succeed in general education.  When schools 
resist providing the integrated setting, it is crucial to look hard at the 
school’s motivations. 
A nuanced approach to applying the integration presumption fits 
well with meaningful reform of special education law.  Children with 
disabilities, except for the small minority with verifiably severe cogni-
tive impairments, should be achieving at grade level with their peers, 
and even those with severe cognitive impairments should be on a par-
allel track.  The way to attain equal achievement is not to separate the 
students with disabilities, and certainly not to send them away for long 
periods of time to segregated classes where expectations inevitably de-
cline.  The way to equality is to provide extra services, technology, and 
accommodations in regular classes so that the children with disabili-
ties do not fall behind.  Any removal should be temporary and specifi-
cally targeted to help the children thrive in general education settings.  
Whatever one thinks of the testing regime established by the No Child 
Left Behind initiative,
45
 it is essential to have the special education 
subgroup attain the same level of educational success as the general 
 
44
The approach I advocate would not employ any presumption that the school 
district is correct simply because it is the school district.  See Weber, Reflections, supra 
note 41, at 44.  Professor Colker criticizes my approach because it looks at the prob-
abilities in contested cases.  Colker, supra note 1, at 861 n.258.  What the courts are do-
ing with the presumption is, of course, applying it to contested cases.  But even in cases 
that are not contested, the educational research confirms that integrated programs 
with full support services are the best option for the vast range of students.  See sources 
cited supra note 23.  Thus, the probabilities on the whole support the presumption. 
45
20 U.S.C. § 6311 (Supp. IV 2004).  It may be argued that the application of 
group standards undermines the individualized focus of IDEA, see Gordon, supra note 
23, at 219-20, but the idea that grade-level achievement ought to be a minimum expec-
tation for everyone is not inconsistent with individualized instruction to achieve that 
goal or other individual goals. 
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population, and that ought to be the job of the school system as a 
whole.  The President’s Commission on Excellence in Special Educa-
tion was correct in declaring that “[c]hildren placed in special educa-
tion are general education children first. . . . Qualifying for special 
education [ought to be] . . . a gateway to more effective instruction 
and strong intervention.”
46
  Special education should mean support, 
not exile. 
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